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VIRGINIA IS FOR LOVERS1 AND DIRECTORS: 
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN  
FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
IN VIRGINIA AND DELAWARE 
 
 
LAURENCE V. PARKER, JR.∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Virginia and Delaware have different approaches to a director’s 
fiduciary duties. The Virginia Stock Corporation Act imposes a deferential 
subjective standard of conduct that allows the more-frequent application 
of its business judgment rule. Virginia courts have followed the Virginia 
Stock Corporation Act and have shown even more deference to the 
decisions of directors than the Virginia Stock Corporation Act may 
require. In addition, Virginia courts have been reluctant to hold that 
additional constituencies, beyond the corporation and shareholders as a 
class, are owed fiduciary duties. Finally, Virginia courts have not imposed 
“enhanced scrutiny” on the decisions of directors involving hostile 
takeovers or changes of corporate control analogous to those fashioned by 
Delaware in Unocol Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. Virginia does not impose fiduciary 
duties between shareholders or between the board and minority 
shareholders, while Delaware has fashioned such duties. The statutory 
and judicial deference in Virginia, the narrower set of constituencies to 
attack a director’s action or inaction, and the absence of any enhanced 
scrutiny in the hostile takeover and change of control context gives 
Virginia a strong argument that it is more director-friendly than 
Delaware.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The longtime tag line of the Virginia Tourism Corporation. See Official Tourism 
Website of the Commonwealth of Virginia, http://www.virginia.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2011). 
∗ Laurence V. Parker, Jr. Partner, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia; J.D., 
University of Richmond School of Law, 2003; M.B.A., The Robins School of Business, 
University of Richmond, 2003; B.A., University of Virginia, 1995. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The deferential interpretation of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act 
(VSCA) by Virginia’s courts gives Virginia an argument that it is more 
director-friendly than Delaware. VSCA was carefully crafted to ensure the 
frequent application of the statutory business judgment rule.2 In addition, 
the rule itself is subjective, not objective.3 Virginia’s courts have not only 
followed VSCA, but they have also been reluctant to hold that additional 
constituencies are owed fiduciary duties or to create enhanced standards of 
review.4  
Part I of this Article discusses contrasts between Virginia and 
Delaware that help demonstrate: (1) in Delaware, the board and majority 
shareholders owe the minority shareholders fiduciary duties,5 while 
Virginia has not adopted this approach;6 (2) in Delaware, the board of an 
insolvent corporation owes fiduciary duties to the corporation’s creditors,7 
but Virginia has not yet held that directors of an insolvent corporation owe 
fiduciary duties to creditors;8 (3) the standard for evaluating a director’s 
duties in Virginia is subjective,9 whereas in Delaware the test is 
objective;10 (4) in Delaware, a board taking steps to resist a hostile 
takeover attempt is held to the “enhanced scrutiny” standard articulated in 
                                                 
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (2006). Virginia’s statutory business judgment rule is 
cross-referenced four times in the VSCA to clarify that it is the proper standard to apply 
to directors: § 13.1-646 (2010) (regarding the issuance of share options), § 13.1-692 
(2006) (regarding the determination that distributions were improper), § 13.1-727.1 
(2006) (regarding Virginia’s affiliated transactions statute), and § 13.1-728.9 (2006) 
(regarding Virginia’s control share acquisition statute).  
3 See infra Section IV. 
4 There are, of course, other factors that support the argument that Virginia may be 
more director-friendly than Delaware, but this Article focuses primarily on fiduciary 
duties. For example, one could argue that Delaware’s statutory limit on exculpation—no 
elimination of liability for claims that arise from the duty of loyalty—has resulted in 
some interesting reasoning in Delaware cases and may be less favorable than Virginia’s 
exculpation provision. Compare VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2006), with DEL. CODE. 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). This is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.  
5 See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Allied 
Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923). 
6 See, e.g., Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 288 (Va. 1999); 
Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Va. 2009) (quoting Am. Gen. Ins. Co. 
v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Va. 1980)). 
7 Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns. Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
8 See Trace Mountain Prod., Inc. v. Special Data, Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 146, 147-48 
(1994) (fiduciary duties may be owed to creditors following dissolution in Virginia).  
9 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (2006) (requiring “good faith business judgment”). 
10 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
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Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,11 whereas in Virginia the board is 
held to a lesser statutory business judgment standard;12 and (5) Delaware 
has adopted enhanced duties for the board where the board has put the 
corporation on the market, known as “Revlon Duties,”13 while Virginia has 
expressly rejected these “Revlon Duties.”14 
Part I of this Article discusses the facts in Willard v. Moneta Building 
Supply, Inc.,15 one of the cases that highlights several key differences 
between Delaware and Virginia. Part II discusses the constituencies owed 
fiduciary duties in Delaware and Virginia when the corporation is solvent. 
Part III discusses the instances where creditors are owed fiduciary duties 
in Delaware, where creditors may be owed duties in Virginia, and the 
limits on those duties. Part IV discusses the standard of conduct for 
directors in Delaware and Virginia. Parts V and VI discuss the enhanced 
standards of conduct adopted in Delaware that have not been adopted in 
Virginia.  
 
I. HOW IS VIRGINIA DIFFERENT? WILLARD V. MONETA BUILDING SUPPLY, 
INC. COUNTS A FEW OF THE WAYS 
 
A 1999 case, Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc.,16 contains 
several examples of the clear differences between corporate fiduciary 
duties in Delaware and Virginia. In Willard, the majority shareholders, 
Amerigo and Rose Mary Cappellari, husband and wife, owned 75.2 
percent of the shares of Moneta Building Supply, Inc. (Moneta), a Virginia 
corporation that owned a building supply business.17 Their son, David, 
owned 5.1 percent of the company, and Ronald Willard owned the 
remaining 19.7 percent.18 David, who was the President of Moneta, 
wanted to purchase his parents’ interest in the company but was not able 
to do so because a Stock Purchase Agreement among the shareholders 
triggered first refusal rights in favor of all of the shareholders, including 
Willard, if David’s parents tried to sell him their shares.19  
                                                 
11 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
12 WRL Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1995). 
13 Named for Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986). This case applied Revlon Duties in Delaware for the first time. Id.  
14 Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. But see Poth v. Russey, 281 F. Supp. 2d 814, 826 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that 
“[w]hen a corporation approaches insolvency, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts 
from the stockholders to the creditors”). 
17 Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 280. 
18 Id. at 280 & n.2. 
19 Id. at 280. 
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Because of this restriction, David resigned as President and director of 
Moneta, but agreed to stay on as a manager until another manager was 
located.20 David formed Capps Home & Building Supply, Inc. (Capps) 
and caused it to submit an Asset Purchase Agreement to Amerigo and 
Rose Mary, who were then the only directors of Moneta, on November 15, 
1996. In the agreement, Capps offered to buy Moneta’s assets for 
$1,300,000.21 Subsequently, David revised his offer and proposed to 
assume Moneta’s liabilities in exchange for a purchase price reduction to 
$1,150,000.22 The offer would remain open until November 23, 1996.23 
Amerigo and Rose Mary, in their capacities as members of the board of 
directors, elected to accept the offer subject to shareholder approval and 
some additional changes in the Asset Purchase Agreement. They called a 
shareholder meeting for December 20, 1996, to vote on the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, and did not make any voting recommendation.24 On 
December 10, 1996, Willard submitted a counter offer to purchase 
Moneta’s assets for $1,550,000, but indicated the offer would expire on 
December 13, 1996.25 Moneta’s Board did not reject the Willard offer and 
encouraged Willard to bring it up at the December 20 shareholder 
meeting.26 Willard increased his offer to $1,750,000 before the 
shareholder meeting, but requested an additional thirty days to determine 
whether an even higher price was warranted.27 At the shareholder meeting, 
Amerigo and Rose Mary voted to approve the Capps transaction, David 
abstained, and Willard voted against the proposal. 28  
After completing the transaction with the Capps, Willard filed a 
derivative action on Moneta’s behalf against Amerigo, Rose Mary, David 
and Capps, alleging, among other things, that the directors of Moneta 
breached their fiduciary duties in approving the sale to Capps, and that the 
sale was a conflict of interest transaction.29  Willard requested that the sale 
to Capps be voided and sought damages, constructive trust over Capps’ 
income, and an award of expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 30 The trial 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 281. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 282. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 282-83. 
30 Id. 
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court dismissed each of Willard’s claims, causing Willard to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia.31  
Willard appealed and alleged that Amerigo and Rose Mary breached 
their duty to maximize the sale price, urging the court to hold that 
directors of Virginia corporations owe Revlon Duties.32 Willard also 
asserted that the directors of Moneta breached their duty of loyalty 
because the transaction with Capps involved a conflict of interest, and that 
the directors of Moneta should not be able to avoid their fiduciary duties 
as directors by not making a recommendation in their capacities as 
directors and then voting to approve the transaction as shareholders.33 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court’s ruling, 
avoided creating fiduciary duties between majority and minority 
shareholders,34 clarified that Virginia’s standard of director conduct is 
measured by a subjective, not an objective standard,35 and declined to 
adopt Revlon Duties.36 The salient facts of Willard—a minority 
shareholder who offered a higher price disputing the sale to the son of the 
directors at a lower price—seemed to weigh heavily in favor of Mr. 
Willard; reasonable people argued that the court could have been true to 
the deference shown to directors in VSCA but come to a different 
conclusion in Willard.37 Despite this sentiment, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia in Willard showed that, not only does Virginia have a deferential 
statute in VSCA, but Virginia’s courts also provide directors broad 
deference.   
 
II. DUTIES OWED TO THE CORPORATION, SHAREHOLDERS, AND MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
In Delaware, a board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the 
corporation,38 the shareholders,39 and the minority shareholders;40 and a 
                                                 
31 Id. at 283. 
32 Id.; see infra Part VI.  
33 Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 286-88. 
34 Id. at 288. 
35 Id. at 284. 
36 Id. 
37 In fact, the leading commentator on Virginia corporate law called aspects of the 
Willard case “puzzling.” See ALLEN C. GOOLSBY, GOOLSBY ON VIRGINIA CORPORATION 
LAW 177 (Matthew Bender ed., 2002).  
38 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
39 Id. 
40See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176, 1180 (Del. 
1995) (recognizing the rights of minority shareholders on issues of fairness and fair price 
analysis). 
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majority or controlling shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the minority 
shareholders,41 especially in transactions that result in a change of control 
of the corporation.42 The fiduciary duties of directors and controlling 
shareholders include the duties of care and loyalty.43  
However, the directors and controlling shareholders are subject to 
different standards of review. In most instances, when assessing the duties 
owed to a corporation or its shareholders, the board of directors of a 
Delaware corporation is entitled to the protection of the business judgment 
rule:44  
The [business judgment] rule operates as both a procedural guide for 
litigants and a substantive rule of law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interest of the company. The presumption initially attaches to a 
director-approved transaction within a board's conferred or apparent 
authority in the absence of any evidence of fraud, bad faith, or self-
dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment.45  
 
The protection of the business judgment rule, however, is not absolute: 
 
To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes 
the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their 
challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary 
duty—good faith, loyalty or due care. If a shareholder plaintiff fails to 
meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to 
protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, 
and our courts will not second-guess these business judgments. If the 
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the 
proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the 
“entire fairness” of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.46 
                                                 
41 Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 
1923). 
42 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-17 (Del. 
1994); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 174, at *36-43 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
43 “Good faith” is not a separate fiduciary duty but a component of the duty of 
loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). 
44 Anti-takeover measures, which are subject to the standard in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and sale of the enterprise, which is subject to 
the duties outlined in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986), are two notable exceptions to the application of the business judgment rule.  
45 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (internal citations 
omitted). 
46 Id. (internal citations omitted). While following Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 
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When a majority or controlling shareholder exercises its majority 
power to receive benefits to the detriment of the minority shareholder, 
Delaware courts have held that the majority shareholder owes the minority 
shareholder a fiduciary duty.47 In this situation, a majority shareholder is 
not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. Instead, entire 
fairness is the standard of review.48 “[T]he ultimate burden of proof is on 
the majority shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the transaction is fair.”49 To demonstrate unfairness of the transaction, the 
plaintiff must first “allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation or other 
items of misconduct.”50 In addition, the controlling shareholder may shift 
the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair.51 This 
may be done if there has been “an approval of the transaction by an 
independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority 
shareholders.”52 
In contrast, in Virginia, the fiduciary duties of directors run to the 
corporation and the shareholders as a class, with no duties owed by 
directors or majority shareholders to minority shareholders.53 Because 
shareholders cannot bring direct claims against an officer or director in 
Virginia,54 a director’s duty to the shareholders as a class may not add 
                                                                                                                         
(Del. 2009), it is clear that officers of Delaware corporations owe the same fiduciary 
duties as directors; however, the extent of the protection the business judgment rule is 
unclear. Some commentators have suggested that the business judgment rule should not 
apply to officers. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW 439 (2005). Virginia has not addressed whether officers 
owe the same fiduciary duties as directors or whether officers may be protected by the 
business judgment rule. Virginia does provide for favorable indemnification of officers. 
Compare VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 13.1-698 (2006), and 13.1-704(B), with DEL. CODE. ANN. 
tit. 8, § 145 (2011)) and, unlike Delaware, allows for exculpation of officers. Compare 
VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-692.1, and DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)). This may allow 
Virginia to lay claim to being more favorable to officers than Delaware. This, however, is 
a topic for another day.  
47 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-22 (Del.  1971). 
48 Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del.  1994). 
49 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983). 
50 Id. 
51 Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117.  
52 Id. However, Delaware courts have held that in transactions where the controlling 
shareholder did not stand on both sides of the transaction but merely was selling 
alongside the minority that both negotiation by a committee of disinterested directors and 
a non-waivable approval by a majority of all outstanding minority shares is required to 
shift the burden to the plaintiff. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 
758-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
53 See, e.g., Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Va. 2009) (quoting 
American General Ins. Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Va. 
1980)). 
54 Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001). 
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much to the duty a director owes to the corporation beyond the duty to 
fully and fairly disclose material information to the shareholders.55 In most 
instances, if a director discharges his duty to the corporation, he probably 
has discharged his duties to the shareholders as a class. Further, while not 
an issue on appeal, the facts in Willard offered an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court of Virginia to hold that majority shareholders owe 
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, but it did not do so. After 
Willard, in Remora Investments, L.L.C. v. Orr,56 the Supreme Court of 
Virginia made clear that there are, in fact, no fiduciary duties between 
shareholders in Virginia.57 As a result, a director of a solvent corporation 
in Virginia has fewer constituencies to whom he owes fiduciary duties—
the corporation and the shareholders as a class—than his counterparts in 
Delaware. This interpretation of the law makes it easier for a director to 
understand his duties and leaves fewer avenues to challenge director 
action or inaction.  
 
III. CREDITORS 
 
In Delaware, when a corporation becomes insolvent, fiduciary duties 
arise in favor of its creditors;58 however, as there is no direct right of 
action in favor of the creditors, the claim must be enforced derivatively.59 
Delaware courts do not recognize fiduciary duties to creditors when the 
corporation is still solvent but in the “zone of insolvency.”60 Delaware 
courts believe that the better policy is to encourage the board of a 
corporation that is not yet insolvent to “continue to discharge their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their 
business judgment in the best interests of the corporation and for the 
benefit of its shareholder owners.”61 Delaware reasoned that finding a 
fiduciary duty to creditors when a corporation is in the “zone of 
insolvency” may involve: 
 
[U]sing the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist. Creditors 
are often protected by strong covenants, liens on assets, and other 
negotiated contractual protections. The implied covenant of good faith 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (Va. 1975). 
56 Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845 (Va. 2009). 
57 Id. at 848. 
58 Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
59 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
101-02 (Del. 2007). 
60 Id. at 101. 
61 Id. 
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and fair dealing also protects creditors. So does the law of fraudulent 
conveyance. With these protections, when creditors are unable to prove 
that a corporation or its directors breached any of the specific legal 
duties owed to them, one would think that the conceptual room for 
concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by 
inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant. Having 
complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm’s creditors, the 
board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk 
for the benefit of the firm’s equity holders, so long as the directors 
comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing 
with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s 
value.62 
 
Delaware courts have held that the insolvency of a corporation, 
however, “makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any 
fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm’s value.”63 For this reason, 
Delaware allows the creditors of an insolvent corporation to derivatively 
pursue claims that a director has breached his or her fiduciary duty.64  
Virginia has not addressed the fiduciary duty to creditors issue 
directly. In Luria v. Board of Directors of Westbriar Condominium Unit 
Owners Association,65 the Supreme Court of Virginia came close, but the 
Luria case was about fraudulent transfers and improper distributions, not 
any fiduciary duty to creditors per se.66 In Luria, John Luria was the 
developer of the Westbriar Condominium, a 224 unit condominium in 
Fairfax, Virginia (Westbriar).67 Mr. Luria owned an interest in several 
entities—Jade Westbriar, Inc., Jade WFW, LLC, and Westbriar, LLC—
which were used to build the project and served as declarants under 
Westbriar’s condominium declaration.68 By virtue of their position as 
declarants under Virginia’s Condominium Act, Mr. Luria’s entities 
controlled Westbriar’s condominium owners’ association (the 
                                                 
62 Id. at 100 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 
790 (Del. Ch. 2004)). 
63 Id. at 102 (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 
794 n.67); see also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 
No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (explaining, 
in a simple hypothetical, how a director of an insolvent corporation would pursue a 
riskier decision that may result in some residue for shareholders if he believed his duty 
was to the shareholders, but would pursue a safer alternative that was likely to cover 
some or all of the corporation’s debt if he believed his duty was to the creditors). 
64 See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 102. 
65 Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837 (Va. 
2009). 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 838. 
68 Id.  
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Association) during construction and initial sale of the units.69 The 
Exterior Installation and Finishing System (EIFS) was applied to the 
exterior of Westbriar in lieu of siding or stucco.70 In June of 1999, Mr. 
Luria learned that the design architect, Christian J. Lessard, believed that 
caulking and flashing were needed for the EIFS in several areas, and in 
October of 2000, Mr. Lessard recommended that a waterproofing engineer 
be hired to verify the application of caulking and flashing.71  
Mr. Luria caused each of his entities to make distributions and 
transfers to him between 1996 and the end of 2002.72 Control of the 
Association passed to the unit owners in June of 2002.73 When the 
Association hired engineering consultants to identify any warranty claims, 
the consultants discovered that there were substantial issues with the EIFS, 
and the consultants recommended that all of the EIFS be removed and 
replaced.74 The Association brought claims against Mr. Luria, including a 
claim that as a manager of Westbriar, LLC, the last entity that served as 
declarant before control of the Association shifted to the unit owners, he 
breached his fiduciary duty to the Association in its capacity as a creditor 
of Westbriar, LLC.75 The claim asserted breach because Mr. Luria made 
distributions to himself from Westbriar, LLC when the Association was 
owed monies to remove and replace the EIFS.76 The trial court found that, 
under the standard in Marshall v. Fredericksburg Lumber Co.,77 Mr. Luria 
breached his fiduciary duty to the Association as a creditor of Westbriar, 
LLC, and Mr. Luria appealed.78  
The Supreme Court of Virginia highlighted its holding in Marshall 
that “where there are existing creditors of a corporation the stockholders 
will not be permitted, as against those creditors, to withdraw the assets of 
the corporation without consideration, whether it be done through a 
purchase of stock by the corporation or otherwise.”79 The Marshall case, 
which was decided well before the current version of VSCA was adopted, 
has been cited as an example of Virginia’s adoption of the “trust fund 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 839. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 173 S.E. 553 (Va. 1934). 
78 Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837, 839 
(Va. 2009). 
79 Id. (quoting Marshall, 173 S.E. at 557). 
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doctrine.”80 However, it appears that the actual issue before the court in 
Marshall was whether the use of corporate assets to redeem stock for the 
benefit of the controlling shareholder’s family members was a fraudulent 
transfer.81 The test enunciated in Marshall seems to be similar to the 
current statutory test for an improper distribution—that is, a distribution is 
prohibited if the corporation is insolvent on a balance sheet test or “would 
not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of 
business”82—and the VSCA’s dissolution provisions that require directors 
to make reasonable provisions for payment of claims before approving a 
distribution to shareholders.83 In each case, under current law, a director is 
not personally liable for the distribution under section 13.1-692 of VSCA 
unless he approved the improper distribution without complying with the 
standard of conduct in Virginia’s business judgment rule under 13.1-690.84 
In addition, the court’s reasoning in Luria suggests that under an unlawful 
distribution analysis, like a fraudulent transfer analysis under section 55-
80 of the Virginia Code,85 the court must first determine whether the 
transferor had actual notice of the claimant’s claim at the time of the 
challenged distribution.86  
Thus, in Luria, the court did not decide whether a manager of an LLC 
or a director of a corporation could owe a fiduciary duty to the entity’s 
creditors; rather, the court held that it was unnecessary to make that 
determination.87 The court ultimately held, because Mr. Luria did not have 
actual notice of the issues with the EIFS at the time of the distributions 
                                                 
80 Bank of Am. v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
81 Marshall, 173 S.E. at 556 (stating the appellant alleged that “the [trial] court erred 
in holding that the stock sale was a fraud, and in entering a decree requiring the 
repayment of the purchase price of the stock”). 
82 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653(C)(1) (2006). 
83 § 13.1-746. 
84 § 13.1-692(A). Directors may seek contribution from other directors and recoup-
ment from shareholders under § 13.1-692(B). See also Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r 
v. Matyiko, 481 S.E.2d 469 (Va. 1997). 
85 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80. 
86 Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 672 S.E.2d 837, 840 
(Va. 2009). Another case, not involving improper distributions, suggested that Virginia 
courts may be reluctant to allow creditors to recover from officers or directors absent 
self-dealing. In Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794, 797-98 (E.D. 
Va. 2002), the court held that such recoveries are only permitted in three extraordinary 
circumstances, each of which require self-dealing from the officer or director: (1) where 
the corporate veil piercing doctrine applies; (2) where officers or directors prefer 
themselves over other creditors, in repaying loans by the officers or directors; or (3) when 
“trust fund doctrine” applies and the directors or officers divert the corporation’s assets 
for their benefit—that is, the corporation is insolvent and the directors or officers 
distribute corporate assets for their benefit that could have been used to repay creditors. 
87 Luria, 672 S.E.2d at 841. 
2011] VIRGINIA IS FOR LOVERS AND DIRECTORS 63   
       
 
and transfers, the Association was not a creditor, and Mr. Luria could not 
have owed it fiduciary duties, even if such duties existed in Virginia.88  
While the court in Luria did not state that directors owe fiduciary 
duties to creditors, it did not rule such duties out entirely. Further, the 
operative provision of VSCA, section 13.1-692, states: 
 
A director who votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation 
of this chapter or the articles of incorporation is personally liable to the 
corporation and its creditors for the amount of the distribution that 
exceeds what could have been distributed without violating this chapter 
or the articles of incorporation if the party asserting liability establishes 
that when taking the action the director did not comply with § 13.1-
690.89 
 
The italicized language suggests that the General Assembly 
specifically expected creditors to be able to recover improper distributions 
directly from directors but only if the directors do not satisfy the standard 
of conduct in section 13.1-690 of VSCA. While Virginia courts have not 
stated that this right to recover arises from a fiduciary duty, directors have 
been held responsible for creditors’ claims where the directors approved a 
distribution in violation of VSCA.90  
Delaware has held that directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when 
the corporation is insolvent, and then the claims may only be enforced 
derivatively.91 Virginia has a statutory scheme that allows creditors to 
recover directly from directors in the narrow instance where the creditor is 
harmed by a distribution approved by the director in violation of the 
standard of conduct in Virginia’s statutory business judgment rule.92 The 
VSCA does not list a creditor among those authorized to pursue a 
derivative action against a director;93 therefore, a creditor may not be able 
to enforce the broader fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed to the 
corporation and its shareholders as a class. However, in Delaware, the 
courts have suggested that they would allow creditors to enforce the 
broader fiduciary duties of care and loyalty directors owe to the 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692 (emphasis added). 
90 Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Matyiko, 481 S.E.2d 469, 472-73 (Va. 1997).  
91 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 102 
(Del. 2007). 
92 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A). 
93 See § 13.1-672.1(A) (referring to derivative and similar proceedings as being 
brought by shareholders without reference to creditors). 
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corporation via a derivative action.94 In short, in Delaware, creditors of an 
insolvent corporation may enforce the full range of fiduciary duties against 
directors via a derivative action, but, in Virginia, under current precedent, 
creditors may only pursue a direct action to recover an improper 
distribution—a much narrower range of creditor remedies against 
directors. 
 
IV. SUBJECTIVE VERSUS OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF CONDUCT 
 
In Delaware, the standard of care is objective: “directors of a 
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount 
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances.”95 If the board does not satisfy this standard of conduct, 
Delaware does not apply the deferential business judgment standard of 
review.96 Delaware has indicated that a failure to meet the standard of care 
requires more than simple negligence.97  
In Virginia, the General Assembly adopted a subjective standard that 
requires a director to “discharge his duties as a director, including his 
duties as a member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith 
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation.”98 This was a 
deliberate effort to avoid the idealized reasonable man standard,99 and 
Virginia courts have followed the subjective approach.100 However, in 
Willard, the court indicated that it will look favorably upon boards that 
engage in an informed and deliberative decision-making process,101 
perhaps not that different from what you would expect an objective 
reasonable man to pursue. The Willard court held that “[i]f a director acts 
in accordance with that standard, Code § 13.1-690(C) provides a ‘safe 
harbor’ that shields a director from liability for any action taken as a 
director, and for failure to take action.”102 However, the business judgment 
rule in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA does not displace common law 
                                                 
94 Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 102. 
95 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
96 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993).  
97 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984). 
98 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (emphasis added). 
99 Joint Bar Committee Commentary (Revised 1999) to VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 
(2007). 
100 Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999). 
101 Id. at 289. 
102 Id. at 284 (quoting Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Matyiko, 481 S.E.2d 468, 
470 (Va. 1997)). 
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fiduciary duties; it merely provides a safe harbor if a director satisfies the 
standard of conduct.103 
Thus, the objective Delaware standard and the subjective Virginia 
standard differ in material ways and could result in different outcomes 
under similar fact patterns. Each approach has its shortcomings.  The 
Delaware approach can be problematic because it may invite the 
application of hindsight bias,104 it is difficult for a trier of fact to apply 
consistently, and, if applied literally (for example, for simple negligence), 
it may hold directors to an unrealistic standard.105 The Delaware Supreme 
Court itself indicated that it may not be perfectly clear what the standard 
of conduct is, but simple negligence is not enough to violate the 
standard.106 While Virginia’s approach has the virtue of simplicity, a 
director who subjectively believes a decision that no reasonable person 
would approve is appropriate, could, at least in theory, benefit from the 
protection of Virginia’s statutory safe harbor under section 13.1-690(C) of 
VSCA. In addition, if a Virginia court emphasizes the decision process, it 
could undercut the subjective standard and turn it into a de facto 
reasonable man standard. Regardless, most directors would probably 
prefer to be judged by a Virginia court applying Virginia’s subjective 
standard as opposed to a reasonable man standard applied by any court.  
 
                                                 
103 Id. at 285; see also the discussion of the common law duty of loyalty in the 
context of business opportunities in Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 676 (Va. 2001).  
The court noted: 
The acts cited by Simmons as constituting Miller’s breach of duty to 
Las Palmas include ‘secretly organizing Las Palmas 
International/Professor Sila.’ Clearly, the organization of [Las Palmas] 
International, a competitor, was not a corporate act of Las Palmas .... 
Although implicating a common law duty of loyalty, this act does not 
fall within the scope of Code § 13.1-690. Miller was not entitled to 
protection under the statutory business judgment rule. 
Id. (emphasis added). Since Simmons, Supreme Court of Virginia has adopted the 
business opportunities provision, which provides a safe harbor for directors seeking to 
take advantage of a corporate opportunity. VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-691.1 (2006). For 
another case that addressed directors’ common law duty of loyalty and actions that were 
not corporate acts of the entity in question, see Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., P.C. v. Langan 
Assoc., P.C., 530 S.E.2d 668 (Va. 2000). 
104 Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and 
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123, 144 (1980). 
105 Joint Bar Committee Commentary (Revised 1999) to VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 
(2007). 
106 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1963). 
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V. UNOCAL AND THE “ENHANCED SCRUTINY” STANDARD 
 
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,107 the Delaware Supreme 
Court adopted an “enhanced scrutiny” standard that a board must satisfy 
before the business judgment rule can be applied if a board takes defensive 
measures to resist a hostile takeover, reasoning that in such cases “a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”108 Under the Unocal “enhanced 
scrutiny” standard, the board must show that it “had reasonable grounds 
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
because of another person’s stock ownership.”109 The defensive measure 
must be motivated by “a good faith concern for the welfare of the 
corporation and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free 
of any fraud or misconduct” and must not arise “solely or primarily out of 
a desire to perpetuate [the directors] in office.”110 Finally, the defensive 
measure “must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”111 
In contrast, in W.L.R. Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,112 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, 
declined to adopt any test based on a common law duty of loyalty and held 
that Virginia’s statutory standard, under section 13.1-690 of VSCA, is the 
proper standard to apply when reviewing director’s actions in the face of a 
hostile takeover attempt.  
 
[T]he Code expressly provides that actions of directors with respect to 
issuing rights or options for the purchase of shares of a corporation are 
subject to review under the standard articulated in § 690. Similarly, the 
Code provides that conduct concerning affiliated transactions ... as well 
as transactions involved in control share acquisitions ... are subject to 
§ 690.113 
 
                                                 
107 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
108 Id. at 954. 
109 Id. at 955. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995).  
113 Id. at 1182 (internal citations omitted); see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646(B) (2010) 
(regarding a director’s duties in connection with the adoption of a rights plan); § 13.1-
727.1 (2006) (regarding a director’s duties in connection with defensive measures taken 
under Virginia’s Affiliated Transactions statute); § 13.1-728.9 (2006) (regarding a 
director’s duties in connection with defensive measures take under Virginia’s Control 
Share Acquisitions statute).  
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In addition, the court held that in evaluating conflicts of interest involving 
a corporate transaction, section 13.1.691, not the common law, governs.114  
In Willard ex rel. Moneta Building Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Building 
Supply,115 the case that the Virginia Supreme Court ultimately upheld in 
Willard, the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia, cited at length and 
found persuasive the trial court’s analysis in W.L.R. Foods, including the 
trial court’s determination that Unocal and C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. 
Barrett116 were not applicable in Virginia.117 Although the Virginia 
Supreme Court did not need to address the Unocal enhanced scrutiny issue 
directly in the Willard appeal, in rejecting Revlon Duties it did adopt the 
Circuit Court of Bedford County’s reasoning and indicated it will stick 
closely to the language of section 13.1-690 of VSCA. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the Supreme Court of Virginia would adopt Unocal 
“enhanced scrutiny” if called on to address the question directly.118  
So, again, Virginia and Delaware differ in a meaningful way. Where 
Delaware presumes that directors may be acting in their own interest in 
adopting anti-takeover measures and imposes an enhanced standard of 
conduct, Virginia provides directors the deference of its statutory business 
judgment rule.  
 
VI. REVLON DUTIES 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.119 and its progeny, imposed additional duties on a 
board of directors of a Delaware corporation if the corporation pursues a 
change of control transaction “on its own initiative or in response to an 
unsolicited offer.”120 A transaction where the target’s stockholders receive 
cash or mostly cash, as opposed to stock in a surviving entity, is a change 
of control transaction and triggers the board’s Revlon Duties.121 However, 
it is not clear exactly what percentage of stock consideration is required to 
avoid Revlon Duties.122 Revlon Duties are intended for the “maximization 
                                                 
114 W.L.R. Foods, 857 F. Supp. at 1183. 
115 Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply Inc., 50 Va. Cir. 
558 (Bedford County 1998), aff’d, 515 S.E.2d 277 (Va. 1999). 
116 124 B.R. 689 (W.D. Va. 1990). 
117 Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 50 Va. Cir. at 565-67 (citing W.L.R. Foods, 
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, 155 F.R.D. 142, 145 (W.D. Va. 1994)). 
118 Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 290 (Va. 1999). 
119 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
120 Lydonell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009). 
121 In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
122 In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995). 
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of the company’s value at sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”123 Once the 
corporation pursues a change of control transaction, “[t]he directors’ role 
[changes] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company.”124  
During the period after an acquisition agreement is signed, but before 
the transaction closes, Revlon Duties continue.125 Cases like Omnicare, 
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.126 emphasize finding the best price even after 
a definitive agreement is executed and have made the contractual 
“fiduciary out”—an ability to terminate the agreement if a superior 
proposal later materializes—a staple in acquisition agreements.127  
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Virginia specifically declined to 
adopt Revlon Duties for directors of Virginia corporations in Willard.128 
Instead, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a board must evaluate the 
“quantity and quality of the offers” and a board is “not required to accept 
an offer merely because it maximize[s] the purchase price.”129  The court 
reasoned that a strict application of Revlon Duties would mean that only 
one offer was in the best interests of the corporation and “would erode the 
deference afforded a director's discharge of duties” under section 13.1-690 
of the VSCA.130 In fact, in Willard, the Supreme Court of Virginia held 
that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties where the 
corporation ultimately accepted the lower of two offers.131 The board 
accepted the lower offer where the higher offer was received late, would 
require a delay in closing, and imposed a risk that the party making the 
lower offer would open his own competing business in the interim, 
thereby harming the value of the corporation’s business.132   
When a Virginia court evaluates whether a board of directors has 
discharged its fiduciary duties in accepting a lower price, the key factor is 
whether the board followed a deliberative process that allowed the board 
in good faith to reach the conclusion that, based on qualitative factors 
other than price, the offer that included a lower price was the better 
                                                 
123 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
124 Id. 
125 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 936 (holding that the omission of a “fiduciary out” clause prevented the 
board from discharging its fiduciary duties). 
128 Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999). 
129 Id. at 285. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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offer.133 In evaluating an offer, a director is entitled to rely on reports and 
opinions prepared by: (1) officers or employees of the corporation; (2) 
committees of the board; or (3) committees of advisors, including 
investment bankers, lawyers, accountants, or other persons, on matters that 
the director believes, in good faith, are within the person’s professional or 
expert competence.134  
Virginia courts have not addressed whether the board of a Virginia 
corporation that is an acquisition target must have the right to terminate an 
acquisition agreement if, after executing a definitive acquisition 
agreement, an apparently superior offer emerges. For example, if the board 
of a Virginia corporation that is an acquisition target (1) holds a 
reasonable auction process, (2) uses a reputable investment banking firm 
to market the corporation to a meaningful number of financial and 
strategic bidders, and (3) makes a decision on selecting a bidder that is 
informed by a fairness opinion from its financial advisor or investment 
bank, then it is possible that a Virginia court following Willard would hold 
that the board did not need a “fiduciary out” to pursue a subsequent bid; 
the acquisition agreement would be enforceable even if it did not include a 
“fiduciary out” and a subsequent bidder offered a higher price because the 
board followed a reasonable process and had no duty to pursue the 
absolute highest price.135  
However, even after Willard, if a target’s board has discussed a sale 
with one suitor, but there are other suitors that may have an interest and a 
similar ability to consummate who are not contacted, the board of a 
Virginia corporation would be wise to bargain for a “fiduciary out” 
because the process it used to select a suitor may not be sufficient. Until 
there is additional case law in Virginia, the safest course of action is for 
Virginia corporations that are acquisition targets to bargain for “fiduciary 
outs” in acquisition agreements. The good news is that these provisions 
have become so commonplace that it is routine for a target’s board to 
request them and out of the ordinary for a suitor to resist them.136 We may 
one day discover that Virginia boards do not need the broad “fiduciary 
out” that is common in acquisition agreements because of Delaware case 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (2006). 
135 Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 285, 289. 
136 See American Bar Association, Mergers & Acquisitions Committee, 2009 
Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study, Slide 61 (Sept. 
17, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL560003 (noting 94 percent 
of all cash deals included in the 2009 survey, 96 percent in the 2007 survey, and 83 
percent in the 2005-2006 survey included a “fiduciary out” termination right). 
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law. In the meantime, the boards of Virginia corporations can and should 
benefit from the practice of including this language in acquisition 
agreements. 
Revlon Duties and the duties of directors of a Virginia corporation may 
not be as different as they seem when comparing Willard and Revlon. 
There is room in the Willard holding to move toward a Delaware-like 
standard. While it clearly will never focus on price alone, the Willard 
court’s focus on process could lead to Revlon-like results in the future. In 
addition, although Delaware’s Revlon Duties clearly impose a price 
maximization duty on directors, Delaware does not require a board to 
blindly pursue the highest price without considering other factors.137 The 
Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that: 
 
[i]n assessing the bid and the bidder's responsibility, a board may 
consider, among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of the 
offer; its fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for 
the offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of 
illegality; the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on 
other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship 
to general shareholder interests; the risk of nonconsumation; the basic 
stockholder interests at stake; the bidder's identity, prior background 
and other business venture experiences; and the bidder's business plans 
for the corporation and their effects on stockholder interests.138  
  
Delaware has also made it clear that there is no single way to satisfy 
Revlon Duties and that Revlon Duties do not require each board to follow 
a strictly defined set of best practices.139 Nevertheless, when Revlon and 
its progeny are compared to Willard, it is clear that the emphasis on price 
is greater in Delaware, and that Delaware courts are less deferential to a 
board’s decision to accept a lower offer than courts in Virginia.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, Virginia and Delaware have different approaches to a 
director’s fiduciary duties. The VSCA imposes a deferential subjective 
standard of conduct that allows the more frequent application of its 
business judgment rule. Virginia courts have followed the VSCA and have 
shown even more deference to the decisions of directors than the VSCA 
may require. In addition, Virginia courts have been reluctant to hold that 
                                                 
137 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286-87 (Del. 1988). 
138 Id. at 1282 n.29 (internal citations omitted). In fact, the court in Willard cited the 
Mills factors. Willard, 515 S.E.2d at 285 n.9. 
139 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242-43 (Del. 2009). 
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additional constituencies, beyond the corporation and shareholders as a 
class, are owed fiduciary duties. Finally, Virginia courts have not imposed 
“enhanced scrutiny” on the decisions of directors involving hostile 
takeovers or changes of corporate control analogous to those fashioned by 
Delaware in Unocal and Revlon. Virginia does not impose fiduciary duties 
between shareholders or between the board and minority shareholders, 
while Delaware has fashioned such duties. The statutory and judicial 
deference in Virginia, the narrower set of constituencies to attack a 
director’s action or inaction, and the absence of any enhanced scrutiny in 
the hostile takeover and change of control context gives Virginia a strong 
argument that it is more director-friendly than Delaware. 
  
